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Supporting materials for our EuroS&P paper: Automated Verification for Secure Messaging Protocols and their Implementations: A Symbolic and Computational Approach.

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Automated Verification for Secure Messaging Protocols and their Implementations: A Symbolic and Computational Approach

Supporting Materials

WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL SOFTWARE

PS2PV, the ProScript-to-ProVerif compiler, is currently in a highly experimental implementation state. Bugs are numerous and to be expected.

Overview

This repository contains supporting materials for our paper, "Automated Verification for Secure Messaging Protocols and their Implementations: A Symbolic and Computational Approach":

  • cv contains CryptoVerif models discussed in the paper.
  • The remaining directories can be used to generate actual ProVerif models from actual ProScript code, that can then be evaluated for queries.
  • paper-longversion.pdf is the long version of our paper with some additional details.

The messaging protocol implementation included in this repository is exactly the same code that is used by the Cryptocat secure messaging software in production.

Instructions

First, install the required OCaml dependencies using opam:

opam install ocamlbuild merlin menhir ulex pcre

Now, you can compile:

cd ps2pv
make
cd ..
make property-messages-principals-direction

This will generate a model by translating whatever is in ps/sp.js and adding the appropriate top-level process for the queries.

  • Valid values for property: secrecy, authenticity, forwardsecrecy, futuresecrecy, indistinguishability
  • Valid values for messages: 1, 3 (or 2 which indicates a "single-flight scenario" for forward secrecy (see paper)).
  • Valid values for principals: AB (Alice and Bob), ABM (Alice, Bob and compromised Mallory)
  • Valid values for direction: oneway, twoway

Note: Not all combinations are currently available. ls tl for current ones.

Benchmarks

On a reasonably fast Intel Xeon machine, these were the verification times we obtained for ProVerif:

  • authenticity-1-abm-oneway: 00h. 24m. 51s.
  • authenticity-1-abm-twoway: 26h. 10m. 08s.
  • authenticity-1-ab-oneway: 00h. 04m. 07s.
  • authenticity-1-ab-twoway: 00h. 09m. 25s.
  • forwardsecrecy-1-ab-oneway: 00h. 06m. 14s.
  • forwardsecrecy-2-ab-oneway: 00h. 14m. 10s.
  • forwardsecrecy-3-ab-oneway: 00h. 46m. 14s.
  • futuresecrecy-3-ab-oneway.pv: 00h. 44m. 25s.
  • indistinguishability-1-ab-oneway: 01h. 51m. 17s.
  • kci-1-a-oneway: 00h. 17m. 35s.
  • kci-1-b-oneway: 00h. 05m. 59s.
  • secrecy-1-ab-oneway: 00h. 03m. 30s.
  • secrecy-1-ab-twoway: 00h. 07m. 06s.

Authors

Nadim Kobeissi, Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Bruno Blanchet. Special thanks and acknowledgments to Antoine Delignat-Lavaud.

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Supporting materials for our EuroS&P paper: Automated Verification for Secure Messaging Protocols and their Implementations: A Symbolic and Computational Approach.

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