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ietf-rats-charter.md

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Introduction

In network protocol exchanges, it is often the case that one entity (a relying party) requires evidence about the remote peer (and system components [RFC4949] thereof), in order to assess the trustworthiness of the peer. Remote attestation procedures (RATS) enable relying parties to establish a level of confidence in the trustworthiness of remote system components through the creation of attestation evidence by remote system components and a processing chain towards the relying party. A relying party can then decide whether to consider a remote system component trustworthy or not.

To improve the confidence in a system component's trustworthiness, a relying party may require evidence about:

  • system component identity,
  • composition of system components, including nested components,
  • roots of trust,
  • an assertion/claim origination or provenance,
  • manufacturing origin,
  • system component integrity,
  • system component configuration,
  • operational state and measurements of steps which led to the operational state, or
  • other factors that could influence trust decisions.

While domain-specific attestation mechanisms such as Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Platform Module (TPM)/TPM Software Stack (TSS), Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance attestation, and Android Keystore attestation exist, there is no interoperable way to create and process attestation evidence to make determinations about system components among relying parties of different manufactures and origins.

Goals

The WG has defined an architecture (draft-ietf-rats-architecture) for remote attestation. The WG will standardize formats for describing evidence and attestation results; and the associated procedures and protocols to convey this evidence for appraisal to a verifier and these attestation results to a relying party. Additionally, the WG will standardize formats for endorsements and reference values, and may apply and/or profile existing protocols (e.g. DTLS, CoAP, or MUD) to convey them to the verifier. Formats and protocols for appraisal policy for evidence and appraisal policy for attestation results are out of scope.

The WG will continue to cooperate and coordinate with other IETF WGs such as TEEP and SUIT, and work with organizations in the community, such as the TCG, Global Platform, and the FIDO Alliance, as appropriate.

Program of Work

The working group will develop standards supporting interoperable remote attestation procedures for system components. The main deliverables are as follows:

  1. Specify use cases for remote attestation (to document and achieve WG consensus but not expected to be published as an RFC).

  2. Specify terminology and architecture that enable attestation techniques.

  3. Standardize an information model for evidence and attestations results scoped by the specified use-cases.

  4. Standardize data models that implement and secure the defined information model (e.g., CBOR Web Token structures [RFC8392], JSON Web Token structures [RFC7519]).

  5. Standardize interoperable protocols to securely convey evidence and attestation results.

  6. Standardize interoperable data formats to securely declare and convey endorsements and reference values.