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rationale.md

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Rationale

The purpose of the rationale is to expound on clauses for which the purpose may be confusing or unobvious. The criteria for including a clause in this document is somewhat arbitrary; inclusion is decided on a case by case basis, usually in response to questions or confusion within the Tox development community.

  • 1.0.2 If a user's client is configured to use a proxy, it is reasonable to assume that the user may be attempting to mask their IP address. Therefore, users must be made aware that UDP traffic may bypass the proxy and reveal their IP address.

  • 1.0.3 If a user's client is configured to use a proxy with UDP connections disabled, it must be assumed that the user's intent is to mask their IP address. Therefore, it should not be possible to bypass the proxy.

  • 1.0.4 Third-party services cannot be accounted for by the Tox Project and are contrary to the decentralized nature of Tox. They may be unreliable, insecure, or otherwise compromised. Therefore the user should always have the option to use the client in a fully functional manner (with respect to the functionality made available via the Tox API) without being forced to use third party services.

  • 2.3.3 PNG images are currently the only image type supported by the Tox core library.

  • 2.3.10 This will ensure that the avatar is unset for all of the user's friends (as long as their clients comply with the avatar protocol as described in this document).

  • 3.1.1 When a friend request is accepted, certain identifying information may become available to initiator of the request. To protect user privacy, this must not occur without the user's explicit consent.

  • 3.1.2 This provides a way for users to verify the identity of the requestor out-of-band (e.g. over the phone or in person) before accepting the request.

  • 3.2.2 When a user joins a group, certain identifying information may become available to all peers in the group. To protect user privacy, this must not occur without the user's explicit consent.

  • 3.2.3 A peer's identity in a group, which includes their group public key and role/permissions, is persistent across client restarts. However, this identity is permanently lost when the client explicitly leaves the group.

  • 4.0.2 As message history may be stored on a user's device in plaintext, it is a matter of security to ensure that this does not occur without the user's explicit consent.

  • 5.0.1 The .tox data file contains all of the information required to steal a user's identity. Therefore users should always have and be aware of the option to encrypt this file.